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  In 1987, Congress amended the Clean Water Act (CWA) [FN1] to allow for qualifying Indian tribes to be treated 
as states for the purposes of certain CWA provisions.  Tribes with substantial governing bodies that meet a variety 
of regulatory requirements may attain "treatment-as-state" (TAS) status.  Among other things, this status empowers 
tribes to set water quality standards for navigable waters that flow through their reservations.  Tribal water quality 
standards may differ from those of the surrounding jurisdictions that have water quality standard-setting authority.  
These surrounding jurisdictions may include the state in which the tribe's reservation is located, a different state, 
and/or another tribe with TAS status. 
 
  The CWA does not explicitly grant tribes with TAS status the authority to set tribal water quality standards that are 
more stringent than the CWA's minimum standards.  By extension, the ability of tribes to preserve their water 
quality by enforcing their water quality standards against upstream polluters is also left unresolved *678 by the 
CWA. [FN2]  The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is charged with the implementation and enforcement of 
the CWA. Through a strained interpretation of the statute, the EPA has construed the TAS provision as allowing 
both for tribal water quality standards more stringent than the federal minimums, and for enforcement of those 
standards against upstream polluters.  The only court to consider the issue to date is the Tenth Circuit in City of 
Albuquerque v. Browner, [FN3] which rejected the EPA's statutory construction while holding on grounds of 
inherent Indian sovereignty that Indian tribes indeed possess the authority to set and enforce stringent standards. 
[FN4] 
 
  In construing the role of Indian tribes under the CWA, both the Albuquerque court and the EPA have failed to 
consider a foundational principle of Federal Indian law: the trust doctrine.  The trust doctrine imposes the highest 
standard of fiduciary duty on executive agencies to act in the best interests of Indian tribes.  As applied in the 
context of EPA discretionary power under the CWA, the trust doctrine provides a powerful tool to Indian tribes to 
protect tribal water resources by setting extremely stringent water quality standards.  The trust doctrine further 
enables tribes to invoke EPA power to enforce those standards against any upstream pollutant discharger. 
 
  Proper recognition of the EPA's obligations under the trust doctrine is critical to the appropriate treatment of tribal 
water quality management, both under and in addition to the provisions of the CWA.  Failure to recognize the trust 
doctrine's impact on the EPA and on the operation of the CWA potentially deprives Indian tribes of the ability to 
protect their water resources adequately.  Additionally, ignoring the trust doctrine's full effect weakens the role of 
Indian tribes in determining the nature of water quality on their reservations.  This Comment addresses the need for 
and the effect of the trust doctrine's application to the CWA's provisions related to the treatment of Indian tribes as 
states. 
 
  Part I of this Comment generally describes the CWA and specifically discusses provisions governing water quality 
standards, *679 the pollution discharge permitting scheme, and tribal treatment as states.  Because the history of 
Federal Indian law is necessary to an understanding of the trust doctrine and tribal power under the CWA, Part II 
discusses fundamental principles of Federal Indian law, inherent Indian sovereignty, the concept of reserved Indian 
rights, and tribal regulatory power.  Part III introduces the trust doctrine and specifically addresses the EPA's 
interpretation of its role in Indian-agency relations under the doctrine.  Part IV addresses the limited case law that 
deals with tribal regulatory power to set and enforce water quality standards under the CWA.  Finally, Part V calls 
for the application of the trust doctrine to the EPA in the specific context of the CWA, and describes the effect of the 
 





The Clean Water Act 
 
A. The Clean Water Act Permitting Scheme 
 
  The CWA constitutes a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme that addresses the need to preserve and protect 
water quality.  The CWA's stated purpose is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity 
of the Nation's waters." [FN5]  While enumerating national water quality goals and policies, [FN6] the CWA 
explicitly describes an active and primary state role in water quality management. [FN7]  Specifically, Congress is 
"to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate 
pollution, [and] to plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and 
water resources." [FN8]  Nevertheless, when the standards of one state affect another state's water quality, state 
water quality standards become part of the federal law of water pollution control. [FN9] 
 
  The CWA contemplates two measures of water quality.  The first measure is effluent limitation guidelines.  The 
CWA requires *680 the EPA to promulgate effluent limitation guidelines. [FN10]  The guidelines are technology-
based [FN11] and must be uniformly "applied to all point sources of discharge of pollutants." [FN12]  Thus, effluent 
limitation guidelines are federal standards applied in all states.  The second measure of water quality is a water 
quality standard.  Water quality standards define "the water quality goals of a water body . . . by designating the use 
or uses to be made of the water and by setting criteria necessary to protect the uses." [FN13]  States set water quality 
standards subject to EPA approval as consistent with the requirements of the CWA. [FN14] 
 
  Water quality standards consist of three elements.  First, water quality standards must delineate designated 
waterway uses that are consistent with the CWA's goals and policies. [FN15]  Designated uses must reflect 
consideration of the value of public water supplies, fish and other wildlife, and recreational, agricultural, industrial 
and other uses. [FN16]  Second, water quality standards must express "[w]ater quality criteria sufficient to protect 
the designated uses."[FN17]  Unlike the technology-based effluent limitation guidelines, water quality standards 
criteria may be expressed either in numeric or narrative form, so long as the criteria specify the amount of pollutants 
that may be present. [FN18]  However, the criteria must be based on "sound scientific rationale." [FN19]  Third, 
water quality standards must contain an antidegradation policy. [FN20] 
 
  The primary means of enforcing effluent limitations and water quality standards is the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination *681 System (NPDES). [FN21]  Generally, the CWA prohibits the discharge of any pollutant into a 
navigable body of water unless the point source has obtained an NPDES permit. [FN22]  Section 1342 of the CWA 
sets forth the NPDES permitting system and describes two distinct but related programs: state permitting programs, 
which must meet EPA approval by satisfying federal requirements, and a federal EPA permitting program. [FN23]  
Absent an approved state permitting procedure, the EPA is the default NPDES permitting authority. [FN24] 
 
  Section 1342(b) authorizes states to establish NPDES permitting programs "for discharges into navigable waters 
within [their] jurisdiction[s]" and delineates program requirements. [FN25]  Essentially, the states must completely 
describe the program, indicate their compliance with the CWA's standards, and show that state law provides 
adequate enforcement authority. [FN26]  The state permitting program's procedural requirements include a provision 
for the protection of affected downstream states.  The permitting state must notify affected states of permit 
applications and must provide the opportunity for a public hearing. [FN27]  Although affected downstream states 
lack veto power over the permit application, they may make recommendations to the permitting state and the EPA. 
[FN28]  If the permitting state rejects the downstream states' recommendations, the EPA may nonetheless block the 
permit's issuance if the permit allows discharges that are outside *682 the CWA's guidelines and requirements. 
[FN29] 
 
  Federal permit issuance programs are substantially identical to state permitting systems.  An EPA permit program, 
and the permits issued via the EPA's program, "shall be subject to the same terms, conditions, and requirements as 
apply to a State permit program and permits issued thereunder." [FN30]  However, the EPA has construed the CWA 
 
as requiring EPA-issued NPDES permits to comply with §  1341(a), [FN31] which applies to a wide class of federal 
permits, including those for construction or operation of facilities that results in a discharge into navigable waters. 
[FN32]  Under §  1341, states in which the discharge is located possess veto power over permit applications that do 
not ensure compliance with the affected states' water quality standards. [FN33]  Affected *683 downstream states, 
however, can only object to the permit, and must then rely on EPA protection of their water quality standards via 
conditioning the permit on compliance.  Thus, under both state permitting programs and EPA-issued permits, 
enforcement of downstream water quality standards against upstream point-source dischargers relies on the EPA's 
willingness to condition the permit.  As discussed in Part V below, however, the EPA's trust obligation toward 
Indian tribes provides increased protection in the permitting process, thereby allowing for enforcement of 
downstream water quality standards against upstream polluters. [FN34] 
 
 
B. Enforcement of State Standards More Stringent Than Required by the CWA 
 
  The CWA not only provides a mechanism through which downstream states may contest NPDES permit 
applications to ensure compliance with minimum federal requirements, but it also indirectly provides for upstream 
enforcement of more stringent water quality standards.  Section 1370 of the CWA expressly provides that states may 
adopt and enforce any pollutant discharge standard, provided such standards satisfy the minimum requirements set 
forth by the Act. [FN35]  The EPA may not disapprove *684 state standards solely on the grounds that the standards 
exceed minimum federal requirements. [FN36] However, downstream states lack direct authority to enforce their 
more stringent standards against polluters in an upstream state.  Section 1370 has been construed to contemplate 
only intrastate, not interstate, application of standards more stringent than those federally mandated. [FN37] 
Specifically, the Supreme Court has held that an affected state may not apply its nuisance laws, such as its more 
stringent water quality standards, against an out-of-state point source. [FN38] 
 
  However, the Supreme Court has established that the EPA possesses the authority to enforce against upstream 
states the more stringent water quality standards of affected downstream states.  In Arkansas v. Oklahoma, [FN39] 
the City of Fayatteville, Arkansas, sought an NPDES permit for a sewage treatment plant located thirty-nine miles 
upstream from the Arkansas-Oklahoma border.  The plant was to discharge its pollutants into a stream that 
eventually flows into the Illinois River, which flows from Arkansas into Oklahoma.  Oklahoma challenged EPA 
issuance of the permit, [FN40] asserting that the discharge violated Oklahoma water quality standards by allowing 
degradation of Illinois River water quality.  The EPA agreed that the CWA required Arkansas to comply with 
Oklahoma water quality standards, but argued that the plant's discharge would have no measurable impact on water 
quality in Oklahoma. 
 
  Although the Arkansas Court declined to decide whether the CWA requires the EPA to apply the water quality 
standards of *685 downstream states to upstream point sources in another state, it stated that "the statute clearly does 
not limit the EPA's authority to mandate such compliance." [FN41]  The Court noted that the EPA's regulations 
provide "that an NPDES permit shall not be issued '[w]hen the imposition of conditions cannot ensure compliance 
with the applicable water quality requirements of all affected States," ' [FN42] a restriction that applies to both EPA-
issued and state-issued permits. [FN43]  Recognizing achievement of state water quality standards as a central CWA 
objective, the Court found the EPA's regulations to be a reasonable exercise of agency discretion. [FN44]  
Furthermore, the Court found that the previously recognized limits on the enforcement power of downstream states 
in no way constrained the EPA's authority to mandate compliance with downstream water quality standards. [FN45]  
Finally, the Court ascribed a federal character to state water quality standards insofar as the standards affect permit 
issuance in another state, entitling EPA interpretation of those standards to substantial deference. [FN46] 
 
  Thus, state power to enforce water quality standards against out-of- state polluters under the CWA is limited.  The 
EPA, however, in the context of both EPA-issued and state-issued water quality permits has the power to condition 
NPDES permits on compliance with more stringent downstream water quality standards.  As described in Part V, 
this agency discretion combined with the EPA's obligations under the trust doctrine constitute a mandate to enforce 
tribal water standards against upstream point sources. 
 
 
*686 C. CWA's Provision for Treatment of Indian Tribes as States 
 
 
  In 1987, Congress amended the CWA to allow for the treatment of qualifying Indian tribes as states with regard to 
certain aspects of the Act. [FN47] Generally, "the treatment of Indian Tribes as States means that Tribes are to be 
primarily responsible for the protection of reservation water resources." [FN48]  To qualify for "treatment-as-state" 
(TAS) status, tribes must meet statutory and regulatory requirements.  Section 1377(e) lists the criteria for TAS 
status:  
    The Administrator is authorized to treat an Indian tribe as a State . . . if -- 
 
  (1)  the Indian tribe has a governing body carrying out substantial governmental duties and powers; 
 
  (2)  the functions to be exercised by the Indian tribe pertain to the management and protection of water resources 
which are held by an Indian tribe, held by the United States in trust for Indians, held by a member of an Indian tribe 
if such property interest is subject to a trust restriction on alienation, or otherwise within the borders of an Indian 
reservation; and 
 
  (3)  the Indian tribe is reasonably expected to be capable, in the Administrator's judgment, of carrying out the 
functions to be exercised in a manner consistent with the terms and purposes of this chapter and of all applicable 
regulations. [FN49] 
 
  "Indian tribe" is defined as "any Indian tribe, band, group, or community recognized by the Secretary of the Interior 
and exercising governmental authority over a Federal Indian reservation." [FN50]  Federal Indian reservation refers 
to "all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, 
notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and including rights-of-way running through the reservation." *687[ 
FN51]  Although reservations are generally thought to have readily defined borders, the Supreme Court has 
indicated the term reservation should be broadly construed to include all Indian country. [FN52]  The EPA 
recommends examining the use of Indian land, not whether it is labeled a reservation, and "considers trust lands 
formally set apart for the use of Indians to be 'within a reservation' for purposes section [sic] 518(e)(2) [§  
1377(e)(2)], even if they have not been formally designated as 'reservations." ' [FN53]  Finally, while the inclusion 
of patent fee land in the definition of reservation is telling, whether §  1377(e) constitutes an explicit delegation of 
regulatory authority over non-Indians is not clearly resolved by the statutory language. [FN54] 
 
  Attainment of TAS status, however, does not result in treatment as states under all provisions of the CWA.  TAS 
status applies only to certain enumerated CWA sections.  Most importantly, qualifying tribes may set water quality 
standards pursuant to §  1313 of the CWA. [FN55]  Additionally, tribes may apply to assume NPDES permitting 
authority.  Thus, a qualifying tribe may both set water quality standards and take over the NPDES permitting 
program, or may administer water quality standards *688 independent of NPDES permitting authority. [FN56]  
Whether the tribe assumes NPDES permit administration may affect the nature of tribal authority in relation to both 
upstream and downstream jurisdictions. [FN57]  However, as discussed in detail in Part V, the EPA's trust 
obligation to Indian tribes renders any distinction based on permitting authority irrelevant and supports upstream 
enforcement of tribal water quality standards. 
 
  Finally, §  1377 directs the EPA to provide a dispute resolution mechanism to address conflicts between states and 
Indian tribes resulting from tribal promulgation of water quality standards. [FN58]  The mechanism is to address 
"unreasonable consequences" resulting from "differing water quality standards" between states and tribes, and must 
provide for consideration of factors such as "the effects of differing water quality permit requirements on upstream 
and downstream dischargers, economic impacts, and present and historical uses and quality of the waters subject to 
such standards." [FN59]  Pursuant to this statutory mandate, the EPA has created a dispute resolution mechanism 
consisting of mediation, nonbinding arbitration, or, if one or more parties refuses to participate, the appointment of 
an individual or panel to make appropriate recommendations. [FN60]  Only a state or tribe may request EPA 
involvement in a dispute; other affected third parties, such as the NPDES permit applicant, may not invoke the 
dispute resolution process. [FN61] 
 
  Despite the CWA's detailed provision for the treatment of Indian tribes as states, two critical issues remain 
unanswered.  Discussed in Parts IV and V below, these issues are whether tribes with TAS status may set water 
quality standards more stringent than those required by the CWA and whether those stringent standards may be 
enforced against upstream polluters.  However, the uniqueness of Federal Indian law warrants an examination of its 






Overview of Federal Indian Law 
 
A. Foundations of Federal Indian Law: The Marshall Trilogy 
 
  Chief Justice John Marshall laid the foundation of Federal Indian law in three landmark cases in the first half of the 
nineteenth century.  The first case, Johnson v. McIntosh, [FN62] did not involve any Indian parties, yet defined the 
nature of Indian land rights in terms which persist today.  In Johnson, Indian tribes had sold land to individual land 
speculators prior to the Revolutionary War.  After the war, the tribes ceded these same lands to the United States in 
the Treaty of Greenville.  The government then sold the land to private parties, including the defendant William 
McIntosh.  The plaintiff, a descendant of a pre-Revolutionary War purchaser, challenged the validity of McIntosh's 
title, arguing that both the English and French had treated tribes as sovereigns with the power to sell land to 
individuals. [FN63] 
 
  Marshall held that the pre-Revolutionary War sale transferred only an Indian "right of occupancy," not full fee 
simple, embracing an Old World Discovery Doctrine based on principles of Christian conquest. [FN64]  Under the 
Discovery Doctrine, Christian discovery of lands "unknown to all Christian people" [FN65] gave "title to the 
government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other European governments, which 
title might be consummated by possession." [FN66]  At the end of the Revolutionary War, Great Britain ceded its 
rights under the Discovery Doctrine, [FN67] giving the United States the "exclusive right to extinguish the Indian 
title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest." [FN68]  The Indian right of occupancy, when combined with 
the discoverer's right, merges into full fee simple.  However, a grant from a tribe to an individual transfers only the 
Indian right of occupancy. [FN69]  This conception of Indian property rights laid a foundation of partial Indian 
sovereignty deeply couched in concepts of fundamental Christian superiority. 
 
  *690 The second case in the Marshall trilogy introduced the concept of a trust relationship between Indian tribes 
and the federal government.  In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, [FN70] the Cherokee Nation sought to restrain Georgia 
from enforcing state laws directed toward the eradication of Cherokee political society and the seizure of Cherokee 
land for state use.  The Cherokee Nation filed suit directly in the Supreme Court under original jurisdiction granted 
by the Constitution over controversies between states and foreign nations. [FN71]  Without addressing the merits, 
the Supreme Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Indian tribes are not foreign nations 
within the meaning of the Constitution.  Instead, the Court found tribes to be "domestic dependent nations," whose 
relationship with the United States "resembles that of a ward to his guardian." [FN72]  This assertion was based in 
part on the Discovery Doctrine embraced in Johnson.  The Court noted that the tribe held a right to occupy the land 
only until the United States extinguished that right. [FN73]  Thus, while not addressing the merits of the case, the 
Court nonetheless further weakened Indian sovereignty and defined the nature of federal-Indian relations. 
 
  In the third and final case of the Marshall trilogy, Worcester v. Georgia,  [FN74] the Supreme Court addressed the 
merits of the controversy avoided in Cherokee Nation, ultimately affirming inherent tribal sovereignty at the 
expense of state power.  Like Johnson, Worcester involved as parties only non- Indians, but had tremendous 
repercussions for Indian tribes.  In Worcester, church missionaries violated Georgia laws prohibiting non-Indians 
from residing in Cherokee territory without a state license.  The state laws, however, were not aimed at preserving 
Cherokee independence by limiting white intrusion. Rather, the Georgia act was an assertion of jurisdiction over the 
Cherokee Nation. [FN75]  Ultimately, the Court held that Georgia had no such jurisdiction; thus, its law was void, 
and the missionaries' convictions were overturned. [FN76] 
 
  *691 Whether the Worcester Court's holding was grounded in principles of Indian sovereignty, federalism, or both, 
remains unclear. Marshall acknowledged that "Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent, 
political communities, retaining their original natural rights . . . from time immemorial," and were capable of making 
treaties with the United States. [FN77]  Explicitly rejecting the idea that the Cherokee nation had surrendered its 
sovereignty and independence by associating with and seeking protection from a stronger power, the Court 
recognized the tribe as "a distinct community, occupying its own territory . . . in which the laws of Georgia can have 
no force." [FN78]  However, the Court completed its denial of Georgia's jurisdictional authority with the assertion 
 
that "[t]he whole intercourse between the United States and [the Cherokee] nation, is . . . vested in the government 
of the United States." [FN79]  This language implies that the federal government may possess the power to legislate 
in the very manner the Supreme Court denied Georgia, notwithstanding the Court's affirmation of tribal sovereignty.  
Nevertheless, Worcester significantly refined the conception of Indian tribes as under the protection of the United 
States government while still recognizing and preserving the principle of tribes as sovereign nations. [FN80] 
 
 
B. Tribal Sovereignty Refined: Subsequent Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
 
  Since the Marshall trilogy, the Supreme Court has refined both its judicial approach to Indian sovereignty and the 
nature of federal-tribal relations.  In United States v. Kagama, [FN81] the most significant case following the 
trilogy, the Court expanded the scope of federal power over tribes it had alluded to in Worcester.  Upholding *692 
congressional power to enact the Major Crimes Act, which extended federal criminal jurisdiction over tribe 
members, the Court held that Congress possesses the power to legislate for the protection and benefit of the tribes. 
[FN82]  Without relying on the Commerce Clause or any other constitutional provision, the Court deemed this 
power to be derived from the very nature of the federal-tribal relationship. [FN83]  The tribes were decreed "wards 
of the nation . . . dependent on the United States . . . for their daily food . . . [and] for their political rights." [FN84]  
Though acknowledging the federal government's role in the tribes' weakened state, the Court determined that 
"[f]rom [the tribes'] very weakness and helplessness . . . there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power." 
[FN85]  This plenary power doctrine frames the trust responsibility within a construct of federal power to determine 
the extent of its obligation to the tribes.  Indeed, the Court has asserted that Congress has the power to determine the 
nature of its "guardianship" of the tribes, including the power to determine when to terminate the guardianship. 
[FN86] However, the concept of plenary power can and must be separated from the concepts of tribal sovereignty 
and the trust obligation. [FN87] 
 
  Notwithstanding the assertion of paramount congressional power over tribes, the Supreme Court nonetheless has 
recognized the existence and preconstitutional origins of inherent Indian sovereignty.  Even while embracing federal 
legislative *693 plenary power in Kagama, the Court deemed tribes to be "semi-independent" sovereigns that 
possess power to regulate their internal and social relations. [FN88]  Because tribal sovereignty, though often 
guaranteed by treaty, does not originate from any federal or constitutional grant of authority, the power of local self-
government vested in Indian tribes predates the Constitution and the federal government. [FN89]  Indeed, Indian 
tribes are separate sovereigns.  While Congress arguably possesses the power to divest tribes of their sovereignty, 
"Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a 
necessary result of their dependent status." [FN90]  Tribes therefore retain their inherent sovereignty to the extent 
that the federal government has not extinguished tribal power.  Included among those powers that have not been so 
divested is the power of self-government. [FN91]  Additionally, this sovereignty includes jurisdiction at least over 
tribe members within the tribes' territory. [FN92]  Indian sovereignty, then, contemplates the existence of a separate 
and autonomous governmental authority. [FN93] 
 
 
C. Reserved Rights 
 
  The concept of reserved rights springs from foundational principles of inherent sovereignty.  Reserved rights refer 
to sovereignty, power, or rights retained by tribes during their dealings *694 with the federal government. Treaties 
between Indian tribes and the federal government did not consist of a grant of rights or power from the government 
to the tribes.  Rather, treaties were "not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them [and] a 
reservation of those not granted." [FN94]  Grounded in principles of inherent sovereignty, this reserved rights 
doctrine not only recognizes inherent tribal sovereignty in matters of self-government, but also adds a geographic 
component to their sovereignty. [FN95]  Reserved rights attach to reservations in the form of an easement. [FN96]  
Importantly, reservations are not necessarily conceived to be fixed geographic areas.  Instead, reservations refer to 
the complete package of reserved rights, ranging from identified parcels of land to the right to access "usual and 
accustomed places" to take fish "in common with citizens of the Territory." [FN97]  While treaties certainly 
embodied the cession of some rights, inherent tribal sovereignty was retained to the extent it was not surrendered, 
and this sovereignty may extend in the form of property rights beyond the borders of designated reservations. 
 
  Specifically, Indian tribes possess significant water rights.  Tribes possess a property interest in reserved water 
 
rights.  Relying on this reserved rights concept, the Supreme Court in Winters v. United States specifically held that 
Indian tribes have an implied reserved water right to sufficient water to render their land habitable. [FN98]  Under 
the Winters Doctrine, this property right in water vested in the tribes no later than the time of the formation of the 
reservation, and could date from time immemorial. [FN99] Considered together, the reserved rights and Winters 
Doctrines supply Indian tribes with off-reservation property interests specifically pertaining to water.  As discussed 
below, these water rights (viewed in light of inherent tribal sovereignty, the federal government's trust obligation to 




D. Tribal Regulatory Power Over Non-Indians 
 
  Despite notions of inherent tribal sovereignty, tribal jurisdiction over non- Indians is subject to considerable 
limitations.  Tribes possess civil and criminal jurisdiction over their members. [FN100]  By contrast, Indian tribes 
have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, whether on Indian land or not. [FN101]  Likewise, tribes appear to 
lack regulatory authority over non-Indians on non-Indian land outside the reservation. [FN102]  In the context of 
jurisdiction over non-Indians within reservation boundaries, however, tribal regulatory authority depends on a 
variety of factors, including ownership of the land, the nature of the relationship between the non-Indian and the 
tribe, and the nature of the non-Indians' activities. 
 
  Although Indian tribes generally lack regulatory authority over non-Indians within the reservation, the Supreme 
Court in Montana v. United States [FN103] enunciated broad exceptions to this rule.  The Court based the general 
denial of regulatory authority on the belief that "exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal 
self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot 
survive without express congressional delegation." [FN104] However, tribes retain inherent sovereign power to 
exercise some jurisdiction over non-Indians within reservation boundaries, *696 even on non-Indian owned lands. 
[FN105]  Specifically,  
    [a] tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter 
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other 
arrangements.  A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on 
fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the 
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. [FN106] 
 
  Given the breadth of these exceptions, an argument can nearly always be made in favor of tribal jurisdiction over 
all land within reservation boundaries, particularly under the health and welfare exception. 
 
  Subsequent cases dealing with tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians on fee land within the reservation, however, 
have complicated the issue.  In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima, [FN107] a fractured court 
variously applied or declined to apply the Montana rule and exceptions.  The Brendale Court faced a complicated 
factual scenario involving a challenge to tribal zoning authority over fee owned land within "open" and "closed" 
portions of the reservation. [FN108]  The Court held in three separate opinions that the tribes had regulatory 
authority only over the "closed" portion of the reservation. [FN109]  Two opinions applied the Montana test with 
opposite results, and the third neglected to apply the Montana test at all. [FN110] Although the lack of a majority 
opinion nullifies the precedential value of Brendale, the opinions obfuscated the issue of tribal regulatory authority 
over non-Indians *697 on fee land and called into question the viability of the Montana test. 
 
  However, the Supreme Court, while still producing differing results in its application, affirmed the validity of the 
Montana test in Strate v. A-1 Contractors. [FN111]  In Strate, decided eight years after Brendale, the Court once 
again applied the Montana test.  Although it found against the existence of tribal regulatory authority, the Strate 
Court declared Montana to be "the pathmarking case concerning tribal civil authority over nonmembers." [FN112]  
Thus, any assertion of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians on fee land within the reservation must meet one of the 






The Federal Responsibility Toward Indian Tribes: The Trust Doctrine 
 
A. Origins and Overview 
 
  Generally, the trust doctrine is the mechanism by which federal obligations to Indian tribes are judicially enforced. 
[FN113]  The trust doctrine requires that the United States and its agents protect Indians' native separatism by acting 
in the best interests of the Indian tribes. [FN114] This trust responsibility toward Indian nations blankets all 
branches of the federal government, though its application varies with each branch.  Congress is held only to a 
rationality standard: its actions must only "be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress's unique obligation 
toward the Indians." [FN115]  Additionally, given Congress's plenary power over Indian affairs, [FN116] it may 
terminate its trust responsibility at any time it deems such termination to be in the interests of Indian tribes. [FN117] 
Executive agencies, by contrast, must fulfill their trust obligations under the highest standard of fiduciary care. 
[FN118]  Finally, the judiciary, while rarely expressly imposing a trust obligation upon itself, utilizes treaty 
interpretation canons of *698 construction which supposedly favor the tribes.  The canons of construction are: 
"ambiguous expressions must be resolved in favor of the Indian parties concerned; Indian treaties must be 
interpreted as the Indians themselves would have understood them; and Indian treaties must be liberally construed in 
favor of the Indians." [FN119] 
 
  Although the precise origins of the trust doctrine are difficult to ascertain, the doctrine is rooted primarily in Indian 
treaties and judicial interpretations of the relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes. [FN120]  
With the cession by treaty of vast tracts of Indian land, the United States accepted a commensurate obligation to 
protect the separatism of the tribes.  Generally, treaties with Indian tribes contain express language referring to the 
federal government's protection of the treating tribe. [FN121]  In addition, treaties with Indian tribes often contain 
provisions providing for the exclusion of non-Indians from reservation land. [FN122] Such provisions strongly 
imply a duty by the United States to protect the tribes' land and interest in separatism. [FN123] 
 
  The trust doctrine has been more fully developed via judicial interpretation to consist of a fiduciary obligation to 
act in the best interests of the tribes.  The Supreme Court in 1831 asserted *699 that the "relation [of the tribes] to 
the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian." [FN124]  Over a century later, the Court recognized that 
"[i]n carrying out its treaty obligations . . . the Government . . . has charged itself with moral obligations of the 
highest responsibility and trust . . . [and] should therefore be judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards." 
[FN125]  The judiciary has also recognized a trust obligation arising from specific congressional acts. [FN126] 
 
  The trust doctrine is of heightened significance in the context of administrative agencies.  Administrative agencies 
must follow their statutory mandates.  However, where the statutory mandate allows for agency discretion, the 
agency may not simply make a "judgment call." [FN127]  Rather, agencies must apply the highest standard of 
fiduciary care with respect to exercises of discretion affecting tribal interests. [FN128]  Absent express provision to 
the contrary, "Congress intends specific adherence to the trust responsibility by executive officials." [FN129]  
Indeed, failure "to demonstrate an adequate recognition of . . . [an executive agency's] fiduciary duty to the Tribe" 
constitutes an abuse of discretion in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. [FN130]  Furthermore, 
administrative agencies' trust responsibility consists of both procedural and substantive mandates. [FN131]  
Although agencies must consider tribal interests in their decision- making processes, mere consideration of these 
interests does not satisfy the trust obligation. [FN132]  To fulfill their trust obligation under the highest fiduciary 
care standard, agencies must not merely consider but also act in *700 the best interests of Indian tribes. [FN133]  
Thus, the trust doctrine in the administrative agency context overlays the agency's statutory mandate and requires 
agencies to act in the best interests of Indian tribes where such action is not contrary to the mandate. 
 
 
B. Trust Property: Water as a Protected Beneficiary Interest 
 
  Indians possess a variety of protected beneficial interests under the trust doctrine.  The most significant category of 
trust property is the Indian land base. [FN134]  Indian land is held in trust by the United States for the benefit of the 
tribes.  In addition, some land that was allotted to individual Indians under the Dawes Act continues to be held in 
trust for those individuals' descendants pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act. [FN135] This beneficiary interest 
in land extends to water rights. [FN136]  Thus, the federal government has a duty to act in the best interest to protect 
land and water as trust assets in which Indians possess a beneficial interest. 
 
 
  Furthermore, at least one court has embraced the view that the fiduciary duty of the United States government to 
protect Indian trust assets should extend to the protection of Indian land base and water from environmental 
degradation. [FN137]  In United States v. Washington, [FN138] the federal district court held, in the context of off-
reservation fishing rights, that Indian tribes are entitled to protection of the environment from man-made 
despoliation.  Given the existence of implied water rights under the Winters Doctrine, on-reservation water surely 
merits similar protection *701 from environmental degradation.  This fiduciary duty to protect water quality 
supplements statutory mandates and supports upstream enforcement of tribally determined water standards as a 
means to protect trust property. 
 
 
C. The EPA's Indian Policy 
 
  The EPA has explicitly acknowledged the federal duty to respect tribal self- government and protect tribal interests, 
and it is in this context that the CWA's treatment of tribes as states must be analyzed.  Throughout the history of 
federal-Indian relations, federal policy has variously undermined, subjugated, supported, and paternalistically 
embraced Indian sovereignty and the trust.  Some past policies, such as allotment and termination, [FN139] were 
based on assimilationist principles and severely weakened Indian sovereignty and self-government.  Other policy 
approaches ostensibly supported Indian self-government, but in reality imposed a majority society governmental 
paradigm. [FN140]  Today, federal-Indian relations are in an epoch dubbed "self-determination." 
 
  The self-determination era refers to the establishment of government-to- government relations and federal 
deference to tribal determination of the extent to which the tribe desires and is able to control and operate federal 
programs. [FN141]  The era began during the Nixon administration, when the President repudiated termination and 
advocated tribal self-determination. Subsequent administrations embraced this approach, including President 
Reagan, who published his Indian Policy in 1983. [FN142]  Reagan's policy emphasized two themes: "(1) that the 
Federal Government will pursue the principle of Indian 'self-government' and *702 (2) that it will work directly with 
Tribal Governments on a 'government-to-government' basis." [FN143] 
 
  In response to President Reagan's clear executive mandate, the EPA produced a set of guidelines for the 
administration of agency programs on Indian reservations.  The guidelines consist of nine key principles that affirm 
tribal sovereignty, tribal self-government, and agency obligations under the trust doctrine.  The nine principles are:  
    1. The Agency stands to work directly with Indian tribal governments on a one-to-one basis (the "government-to-
government" relationship), rather than as subdivisions of other governments. . . . 
 
  2. The Agency will recognize tribal governments as the primary parties for setting standards, making 
environmental policy decisions and managing programs for reservations, consistent with agency standards and 
regulations. . . . 
 
  3. The Agency will take affirmative steps to encourage and assist tribes in assuming regulatory and program 
management responsibilities for reservation lands. . . . 
 
  4. The Agency will take appropriate steps to remove existing legal and procedural impediments to working directly 
and effectively with tribal governments on reservation programs. . . . 
 
  5.The Agency, in keeping with the federal trust responsibility, will assure that tribal concerns and interests are 
considered whenever EPA's actions and/or decisions may affect reservation environments. . . . 
 
  6. The Agency will encourage cooperation between tribal, state and local governments to resolve environmental 
problems of mutual concern. . . . 
 
  7. The Agency will work with other federal agencies which have related responsibilities on Indian Reservations to 
enlist their interest and support in cooperative efforts to help tribes assume environmental program responsibilities 
for reservations. . . . 
 
  8. The Agency will strive to assure compliance with environmental statutes and regulations on Indian reservations. 
 
. . . 
 
  9. The Agency will incorporate these Indian policy goals into its planning and management activities, including its 
budget, operating guidance, legislative initiatives, management accountability system and ongoing policy and 
regulation development processes. . . . [FN144] 
 
  The policy clearly distinguishes tribal governmental jurisdiction from that of state and federal government, and 
encourages federal and state efforts to increase tribal involvement in and control *703 over administration of 
environmental programs on reservations. [FN145]  Significantly, the EPA policy explicitly recognizes its trust 
obligation. [FN146]  However, the policy statement directs the EPA only to "consider" Indian interest, indicating 
recognition merely of a procedural, rather than substantive, trust obligation. As discussed in Part V, the trust 





Case Law Addressing Enforcement Under the CWA of Tribal Water Quality Standards 
Against Upstream Polluters 
 
  Two thorny issues that have arisen in the context of TAS designation of Indian tribes, and that are the focus of this 
Comment, are whether tribes with TAS status may set water quality standards more stringent than those required 
under the CWA, and the extent to which those standards must be enforced against upstream point source dischargers 
either within the same state or in another state.  Section 1377(e), the TAS provision, does not reference §  1370, 
which allows states to adopt and enforce water quality standards more stringent than required by the CWA, as one of 
the provisions under which tribes are entitled to TAS.  Even if tribes with TAS status may adopt more stringent 
water quality standards, the CWA does not clearly resolve the complicated jurisdictional issue of enforcement 
against other states. 
 
  To date, two courts have addressed the ability of Indian tribes with TAS status under the CWA to enforce tribal 
water quality standards against non- Indians upstream.  The first, City of Albuquerque v. Browner, [FN147] 
affirmed tribal sovereignty and allowed for the application of tribal water quality standards against the City of 
Albuquerque, located upstream from the tribe with TAS authority to set water quality standards.  The second, 
Montana v. EPA, [FN148] approved of Albuquerque and allowed for extension of tribal water quality standards over 
non-Indian fee lands on the reservation. 
 
 
*704 A. City of Albuquerque v. Browner 
 
  The Rio Grande River flows through the Isleta Pueblo reservation in New Mexico before turning east to form the 
Texas-Mexico border.  Granted TAS status under the CWA, the Isleta Pueblo Tribe set Rio Grande water quality 
standards more stringent than those of New Mexico.  The City of Albuquerque possessed an NPDES permit, issued 
prior to the promulgation of Isleta Pueblo water quality standards, for discharges in the Rio Grande from its waste 
water treatment plant.  The approval of Isleta Pueblo standards required the EPA to revise the City of Albuquerque's 
permit to provide for compliance with tribal standards. Before EPA completion of this revision, the City of 
Albuquerque challenged EPA approval of the Isleta Pueblo water quality standards.  The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the EPA, [FN149] and the City of Albuquerque appealed.  While the case was on 
appeal, the parties, participating in the CWA dispute resolution process, reached an agreement on the terms of the 
City of Albuquerque's permit. [FN150] 
 
  The Albuquerque court faced a number of issues. [FN151]  Most importantly, the City of Albuquerque challenged 
the EPA's interpretation of the CWA to afford the Isleta Pueblo tribe authority to adopt water quality standards more 
stringent than required by statute and the application of those more stringent standards *705 against an upstream 
NPDES permit holder. [FN152]  In response, the Albuquerque court first asserted that §  1377(e), the TAS 
provision, is ambiguous because not all provisions of the CWA are incorporated by that section. [FN153]  
Specifically at issue was the fact that the TAS provision does not incorporate §  1370, which allows for states to set 
standards more stringent than the federal minimum.  In approving the Isleta Pueblo water quality standards, the EPA 
 
relied on §  1370 as authorizing the tribe to set standards more stringent than those federally mandated. [FN154]  
The court, however, explicitly rejected the argument that §  1370 was somehow incorporated by §  1377(e).  Instead, 
the Albuquerque court relied on principles of inherent tribal sovereignty to allow tribal water quality standards more 
stringent than those required by the CWA.  Specifically, the court recognized that "Indian tribes have residual 
sovereign powers that already guarantee the powers enumerated in §  1370, absent an express statutory elimination 
of those powers." [FN155]  The court concluded that the construction of the CWA to allow for tribes who qualify 
for TAS status to set stringent water quality standards was consistent with principles of inherent Indian tribal 
sovereignty. [FN156] 
 
  The Albuquerque court also upheld the enforcement of the tribal standards against the City of Albuquerque as an 
upstream polluter.  However, the court avoided discussion of tribal sovereignty with regard to enforcement power.  
Responding to the argument of the City of Albuquerque that §  1377 does not expressly permit tribes to enforce 
water quality standards outside reservation boundaries, the court advised reading the CWA as a "comprehensive 
regulatory scheme" and admonished against construing provisions selectively and in isolation. [FN157]  Reading the 
CWA as a whole, the court found that the EPA, not the tribe, was exercising its statutory authority in issuing 
NPDES permits in compliance with downstream water quality standards. [FN158] 
 
  Under Albuquerque, Indian tribes who qualify for TAS do not *706 have the authority to enforce tribal water 
quality standards against upstream point source dischargers.  Instead, tribes must rely on the EPA's authority and 
obligations under the CWA to issue permits only in compliance with tribal water quality standards.  As discussed 
below, however, the Albuquerque approach does not guarantee enforcement of tribal standards against upstream 
polluters. Enforcement of the EPA's trust obligation is necessary to ensure the application of tribal water quality 
standards to all upstream dischargers. 
 
 
B. Montana v. EPA 
 
  The second case to deal with Indian TAS issues, Montana v. EPA, [FN159] addressed the enforcement of tribal 
water quality standards against upstream non-Indian polluters within the borders of the tribe's reservation.  The 
Flathead reservation contains Flathead Lake, a source of water for many different uses, including agriculture, 
industry, and domestic use.  The reservation "reflects a pattern of mixed ownership and control between tribal and 
non-tribal entities," which include NPDES permit holders, such as the state, county, and several municipalities. 
[FN160]  The EPA granted the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes (the Tribes) TAS status over all land within 
the reservation, including non-Indian land, based on the agency's determination that the Tribes possess "inherent 
authority over non-members on fee lands." [FN161]  Montana then launched a facial challenge to the regulations 
adopted pursuant to §  1377(e) that allow for application of tribal water quality standards to fee lands on the 
reservation. [FN162]  The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the EPA and the Tribes. [FN163] 
 
  The EPA took the position that Indian tribes with TAS status possess regulatory authority over non-Indians within 
the reservation under the second Montana exception, which governs non-Indian activities affecting tribal health and 
welfare.  The EPA has construed the CWA generally as "a legislative determination that *707 activities which affect 
surface water and critical habitat quality may have serious and substantial impacts." [FN164]  Given this, upon a 
general showing of facts that reservation waters are used by the tribe or tribal members and that the waters and 
critical habitat are subject to CWA protection, the EPA will "presume that there has been an adequate showing of 
tribal jurisdiction of fee lands." [FN165]  An adjacent state may rebut the presumption by demonstrating a lack of 
tribal jurisdiction. [FN166] 
 
  The Montana court held that the EPA's regulations reflect an  "appropriate delineation and application of inherent 
Tribal regulatory authority over non-consenting non-members." [FN167]  Applying the second Montana exception, 
the court found that the activities of point source dischargers on non-Indian land posed a serious threat to the health 
and welfare of the Tribes. [FN168]  The court explicitly recognized that "'conduct that involves the tribe's water 
rights" ' falls within those activities encompassed by the second Montana exception. [FN169]  Therefore, the Tribes 
possess regulatory authority over non-Indian polluters notwithstanding the fact that non-Indian fee lands are 






CWA Treatment as States Status in Light of the Trust Doctrine 
 
  Neither courts nor the EPA have adequately considered the impact of the trust doctrine on the treatment of Indian 
tribes under the CWA.  By obligating the EPA to exercise in favor of Indian tribes its discretionary power to 
approve water quality standards, application of the trust doctrine supports the authority *708 of tribes with TAS 
status to set standards more stringent than required by the CWA.  Likewise, the EPA's fiduciary duty under the trust 
doctrine to act in Indian tribes' best interests requires the EPA to condition all upstream NPDES permits on 
compliance with tribal water quality standards. Finally, the EPA should utilize its discretionary power to promulgate 
and enforce stringent water quality standards for reservation waters even where the applicable tribe may not qualify 
for TAS status but is otherwise governed by an established tribal government. 
 
 
A. EPA Approval of Tribal Water Quality Standards More Stringent Than Required by the CWA 
 
  Although the EPA explicitly recognizes its trust obligation, the agency misconstrues the manner of its application.  
The EPA Indian Policy states that "[t]he Agency, in keeping with the federal trust responsibility, will assure that 
tribal concerns and interests are considered whenever EPA's actions and/or decisions may affect reservation 
environments." [FN171]  This policy statement envisions only a procedural aspect to the trust obligation with no 
substance.  The EPA is charged with approving state- and tribe-promulgated water quality standards.  In the context 
of approving water quality standards, the EPA may satisfy the trust obligation as recognized by the policy statement 
by merely "considering" tribal interests.  In other words, the EPA may act contrary to tribal interests by simply 
acknowledging tribal interests are affected by its actions.  This construction of the trust responsibility ignores any 
substantive obligation to act in the tribes' best interests, and is contrary to the highest standard of fiduciary care 
imposed upon executive agencies.  The EPA must reformulate its policy statement to conform to an understanding 
of its trust obligation as a substantive as well as procedural mandate. [FN172] 
 
  As a substantive mandate to act in the best interests of the tribes, the trust obligation, together with principles of 
inherent Indian sovereignty, supports tribal authority to set water quality standards more stringent than those 
mandated by federal law.  As discussed above, §  1370 provides states with the authority "to adopt or enforce . . . 
any standard or limitation respecting discharges of pollutants." [FN173]  This section is not among the sections *709 
under which qualifying tribes may receive treatment as states. However, the EPA has construed this as a "savings 
clause" rather than a delegation of power to states.  According to the EPA, §  1370 merely recognizes existing state 
authority to set water quality standards and indicates that such authority is not preempted by the CWA except to the 
extent the CWA requires certain minimum standards. [FN174]  Relying on legislative history and statutory 
construction, [FN175] the EPA interprets tribes with TAS status likewise to possess the authority under §  1370 to 
set any water quality standard that meets or exceeds federal minimum standards. 
 
  As discussed in Part IV, however, the Tenth Circuit in City of Albuquerque v. Browner rejected this interpretation 
of the CWA.  The Albuquerque court held, without analysis, that tribes with TAS status possess inherent 
sovereignty that empowers them to set water quality standards more stringent than those required by the federal 
government. [FN176]  Although this holding reflects an appropriate understanding of the nature of inherent tribal 
sovereignty, the EPA does not possess the authority to construe the scope of tribal sovereignty. [FN177] 
 
  A sounder position for the EPA's determination that tribes with TAS status may set stringent water quality 
standards rests in the trust doctrine.  Absent an interpretation that tribes qualify as states for purposes of §  1370, the 
CWA is silent regarding whether tribes may set water quality standards more stringent than those set by the federal 
government.  Hence, the nature of the water quality standards a tribe may set constitutes a pocket of *710 agency 
discretion, [FN178] triggering the EPA's fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the tribes.  Acting in the best 
interests of the tribes in the context of water quality standards certainly encompasses providing the tribe and its 
members with the highest degree of water quality protection available. Additionally, the EPA has a trust duty to 
protect tribes' beneficial interest in water resources on the reservation, which duty supports EPA approval of 
stringent tribal standards.  Finally, self-government must be both supported pursuant to the EPA Indian Policy and 
recognized as a protected beneficiary interest under the trust doctrine.  The EPA therefore has a fiduciary obligation 
to defer to tribal government decisions regarding what water quality standards best serve tribal interests.  Because 
 
approval of water quality standards represents an area of agency discretion, the EPA has a duty under its trust 
obligation to approve tribe-promulgated water quality standards that are more stringent than federal minimum 
standards.  Reliance on the trust doctrine for this approval removes the issue from the cloud of uncertainty created 
by the EPA's reliance on a dubious statutory construction and significantly augments inherent Indian sovereignty as 
a basis for approval of stringent tribal standards. 
 
  TheEPA also can rely on the trust doctrine to counter assertions that there must be an upper limit to the stringency 
of tribal water quality standards.  Under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), agency action must not be 
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." [FN179]  One commentator 
argues that although the EPA may not have the power to disapprove a water quality standard based on stringency 
alone, the agency must nonetheless act reasonably or risk classification of its actions as unlawfully arbitrary and 
capricious. [FN180]  Although the CWA allows standard-setting entities to force technological development through 
stringent water quality standards, [FN181] whether the EPA reasonably can approve standards more stringent than 
natural background water quality has been a contentious issue.  One proposed solution is the imposition of a *711 
standard requiring the EPA to review the reasonableness of tribal water quality standards. [FN182]  The guiding 
criteria of reasonableness would be those listed in §  1377(e) with regard to dispute resolution: [FN183] 
consideration of "the effects of differing water quality permit requirements on upstream and downstream 
dischargers, economic impacts, and present and historical uses and quality of the waters subject to such standards." 
[FN184] 
 
  In light of the EPA's trust obligation, however, no artificially constructed reasonableness standard is necessary to 
justify EPA approval of stringent tribal water quality standards, even those which exceed natural background water 
quality.  The arbitrary and capricious review standard under the APA is very deferential, resulting in a finding 
adverse to the agency only "if the agency . . . has entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem." 
[FN185]  Because it is subject to the highest standard of fiduciary duty with regard to approval of tribal standards, 
the EPA must approve tribal water quality standards that meet the CWA's statutory requirements regardless of the 
stringency of the standards.  Fulfillment of this fiduciary duty prevents the agency's action in providing such 
approval from being characterized as arbitrary and capricious.  On the contrary, neglecting to act in accordance with 
its trust obligation would be an EPA violation of the APA because it would constitute a failure to consider a vital 
aspect of the issue being addressed. 
 
 
B. EPA Enforcement of Tribal Water Quality Standards Against Upstream Point Source Dischargers 
 
  The trust doctrine provides a statutory overlay that greatly strengthens the CWA's basic framework in support of 
enforcement of tribal water quality standards against upstream point source dischargers.  When the EPA is the 
NPDES permitting authority, the state or tribe where the point source discharger is located must issue a certification 
that the discharge will comply with that jurisdiction's water quality standards and effluent limitations. [FN186] After 
the EPA receives the certification, if the discharge may affect other states or tribes, all such potentially *712 affected 
states and tribes must be notified. [FN187]  Affected states and tribes may then object to the proposed permit, and 
the EPA must make a recommendation with respect to the objections. [FN188]  When the EPA is the agency issuing 
the permit (as opposed to some other federal agency, such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, involved 
in issuing permits for activities that affect water quality), EPA recommendations naturally will be adopted in the 
permit. Regardless, the inclusion in the NPDES permit of an EPA recommendation that the permit be conditioned on 
adherence to downstream tribal water quality standards depends on EPA willingness to recommend such 
compliance.  Similarly, when the state is the permitting authority, compliance with downstream tribal water quality 
standards requires both tribal objection to issuance of the permit absent such protection and EPA willingness to 
block permit issuance. [FN189]  Thus, enforcement of tribal water quality standards against upstream point source 
dischargers is at the discretion of the EPA. 
 
  Given that whether stringent tribal water quality standards will be enforced against upstream polluters is an area of 
EPA discretion, the trust doctrine requires that the EPA apply tribal standards to all upstream permits. As discussed 
above, the EPA must accept tribal water quality standards, regardless of stringency.  Because the EPA has a 
fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the tribes, the EPA must act pursuant to tribal objections and 
recommendations regarding upstream permits.  Any exercise of discretion contrary to tribal interests, any "judgment 
call" in favor of permit issuance to an upstream point source over tribal objections, whether on its face permissible 
 
under the CWA, would constitute a breach of the agency's trust obligation resulting in EPA liability for any resulting 
damage to tribal water quality.  The EPA's fiduciary duty under the trust doctrine requires the EPA to condition all 
upstream permits on compliance with tribal water quality standards. [FN190] 
 
  The trust doctrine also plays a role in the dispute resolution *713 procedure set out in §  1377(e) to address discord 
likely to arise from uniform upstream enforcement of tribal water quality standards.  The EPA has specifically 
considered its role in the dispute resolution process in light of its Indian Policy and trust obligation and rejected the 
suggestion that the agency must give special consideration to tribal interests.  The "EPA believes that its role in 
dispute resolution is to work with all parties to the dispute in an effort to reach an agreement that resolves the 
dispute.  The Agency shall not have a predisposition to support any party's position in disputes over water quality 
standards." [FN191]  While neutrality in the dispute resolution process is desirable, impartial EPA participation in 
tribal-state disputes conflicts with the agency's trust obligation. 
 
  Additionally, the dispute resolution default procedure is unworkable as a neutral mechanism given the EPA's trust 
obligation.  Under CWA regulations, the default dispute resolution procedure if one or both parties refuse to 
participate in mediation or arbitration is simply the EPA reviewing the situation considering all available 
information and making a non-binding recommendation for resolution of the dispute. [FN192]  In weighing tribal 
and state interests in a dispute regarding enforcement of tribal water quality standards, the EPA must favor tribal 
interests.  Considering the EPA's fiduciary duty under the trust doctrine, the dispute resolution process must be 
reconsidered to provide a neutral process for achieving the avoidance of "unreasonable consequences" arising from 
enforcement of stringent tribal standards as required by the CWA. [FN193]  This revised dispute process must 




C. The Trust Doctrine as a Means to Broaden Tribal Power to Determine and Enforce Water Quality Standards 
 
  The trust doctrine also provides support for broadening the scope of tribal ability to set water quality standards by 
allowing the EPA to exercise its discretion in favor of tribes that do not yet qualify for TAS status. Until a tribe 
attains TAS status, the EPA assumes that state water quality standards apply to reservation *714 waters. [FN194]  
Acknowledging "that, as a legal matter, there may be some question as to whether State standards apply to 
reservation waters," the EPA asserts that because no general federal water quality standards exist, application of 
state standards is necessary to avoid a "regulatory void." [FN195]  However, the CWA authorizes the EPA to set 
water quality standards on reservations where tribes lack TAS status. [FN196]  Nevertheless, while the EPA will 
consider federal promulgation of water quality standards on Indian reservations where a particular need exists, it 
views EPA water quality standard promulgation as a last resort. [FN197] In fact, the EPA baldly maintains, without 
analysis, that "EPA Indian Policy dictates that Federal promulgation should only be pursued as a final course of 
action." [FN198] 
 
  The EPA misinterprets its obligations under the trust doctrine and its own Indian Policy.  The Indian Policy calls 
for recognition of tribal governments as the primary parties for setting environmental standards. [FN199]  In light of 
this policy and the self-determination era's general goal of government-to-government relations, the EPA should 
defer not to state standards, but to tribal recommendations regarding appropriate water quality standards for 
reservation waters regardless of whether the tribal government has met the specific administrative requirements for 
qualification for TAS status.  Certainly, the EPA should continue to require that the tribe have "a governing body 
carrying out substantial governmental duties." [FN200] However, where a tribal government fails to qualify for TAS 
status due, for example, to lack of administrative capability or resources, or even inability to define adequately 
geographic boundaries of tribal jurisdiction, the EPA should nonetheless adopt the tribe's water quality standards.  
Use of agency discretion to promulgate for reservation waters federal standards that are based on tribal government 
recommendations supports rather than violates the EPA Indian Policy *715 that requires recognition of tribal 
government as the primary party for setting water quality standards. 
 
  Furthermore, EPA Indian Policy and the trust doctrine obligate the EPA to consider and act in the best interests of 
Indian tribes.  The EPA has a fiduciary duty to preserve and support self-government when the statutory framework 
within which the EPA operates allows for agency discretion.  The EPA has at its discretion the authority to 
determine the stringency of water quality standards on Indian reservations.  "[W]ater quality management serves the 
 
purpose of protecting public health and safety, which is a core governmental function, whose exercise is critical to 
self-government." [FN201]  Because, as indicated above, self-government is a protected trust interest, the trust 
doctrine supports giving a measure of water quality management to tribes regardless of their qualification for TAS 
status.  Where a tribal government determines that stringent water quality standards are in the best interests of its 
constituents, the EPA must defer to this governmental determination.  Tribes with substantial tribal governments 
should be able to determine the appropriate water quality standards for navigable reservation waters and rely on the 
EPA to promulgate and enforce those standards. [FN202] 
 
  Similarly, the EPA's fiduciary duty encompasses an obligation to preserve the reservation environment, including 
water as a specific trust asset.  This trust obligation mandates the creation and enforcement of stringent water quality 
standards for reservation waters regardless of whether a tribal government has recommended the standards or even 
whether the tribe has an established government.  In such a case, the EPA must determine what water quality 
standard best protects the tribe's interests and condition all upstream NPDES permits on compliance with those 
standards.  Furthermore, tribes have reserved rights in the water resources on the reservation under the Winters 
Doctrine.  The EPA as fiduciary to the tribes also must protect these reserved rights.  Just as upstream users of 
reservation waters cannot divert water such that tribal welfare is affected, neither can upstream point source 
dischargers pollute those waters to the tribe's detriment, *716 regardless of whether the tribe possesses TAS status 





  In today's era of Indian self-determination, recognition of tribal governmental authority is increasingly common.  
However, despite considerable retained sovereignty, Indian tribes are nonetheless constrained by jurisdictional and 
other limitations on their regulatory power.  Under current case law, Congress is the ultimate authority regarding the 
nature of Indian sovereignty and authority.  Although Congress has provided for the treatment of qualifying Indian 
tribes as states under certain provisions of the CWA, this explicit statutory authorization constitutes an incomplete 
empowerment of Indian tribes.  Given this, issues regarding the nature of tribal power under the CWA have been left 
to the executive and judiciary branches to resolve. 
 
  Because of the failure to account for the effect of the trust doctrine, the responses of the EPA and judiciary to 
questions regarding tribal authority to set and enforce water quality standards under the CWA have been incomplete. 
Admittedly, both the EPA and the courts have supported Indian authority to protect reservation water resources via 
the enforcement of strict water quality standards.  Nevertheless, the extent of tribal influence over water quality 
protection has been lessened by the failure of the EPA and the courts to consider adequately the role of the EPA's 
obligations under the trust doctrine. 
 
  This Comment calls for the application of principles of the trust doctrine to the EPA in the context of the CWA's 
treatment of Indian tribes.  Under the trust doctrine, the EPA has a fiduciary obligation to act in the best interest of 
tribes and to exercise any agency discretion in favor of tribal interests. Thus, the trust doctrine constitutes a critical 
means for maximizing tribal empowerment and must be applied whenever discretionary agency action affects tribal 
interests.  Because the CWA allows for substantial EPA discretion in the context of water quality standards, the trust 
doctrine must be applied to ensure a maximum tribal role in the protection of tribal water quality. 
 
 




[FN1]. 33 U.S.C. § §  1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
 
 
[FN2]. If the CWA only allows tribes to set standards equal to the federal minimum standards, enforcement of those 
standards against upstream polluters would be an irrelevant issue.  Upstream polluters would be required to comply 




[FN3]. 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 
 
[FN4]. See id. at 423-24. 
 
 
[FN5]. 33 U.S.C. §  1251(a) (1994). 
 
 
[FN6]. See 33 U.S.C. §  1251(a)(1)-(7) (1994). 
 
 






[FN9]. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 110 (1992). 
 
 
[FN10]. 33 U.S.C. §  1314(b) (1994). 
 
 
[FN11]. See generally 33 U.S.C. §  1314 (1994).  The guidelines must set  "criteria for water quality accurately 
reflecting the latest scientific knowledge."  33 U.S.C. §  1314(a)(1) (1994). 
 
 
[FN12]. 33 U.S.C. §  1311(e) (1994).  Point sources are discernible, known conveyances from which pollutants are 
discharged.  33 U.S.C. §  1362(14) (1994).  Agricultural stormwater discharges and "return flows from irrigated 
agriculture" are not point sources.  Id. 
 
 
[FN13]. 40 C.F.R. §  131.2 (2000). 
 
 
[FN14]. See 33 U.S.C. §  1313 (1994).  The EPA sets water quality standards for states which fail to submit 
appropriate standards.  33 U.S.C. §  1313(b)(1), (i)(2) (1994). 
 
 
[FN15]. 40 C.F.R. §  131.6(a) (2000). 
 
 
[FN16]. 40 C.F.R. §  131.10(a) (2000). 
 
 
[FN17]. 40 C.F.R. §  131.6(c) (2000). 
 
 
[FN18]. 40 C.F.R. §  131.3(b) (2000). 
 
 




[FN20]. 40 C.F.R. §  131.6(d) (2000).  Antidegradation policies generally are designed to protect existing water 




[FN21]. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992); 33 U.S.C. §  1342(a) (1994). 
 
 
[FN22]. See Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 102; 33 U.S.C. §  1311 (1994). 
 
 
[FN23]. See 33 U.S.C. §  1342 (1994). 
 
 
[FN24]. 33 U.S.C. §  1342(a) (1994). 
 
 






[FN27]. 33 U.S.C. §  1342(b)(3) (1994).  Section 1342(b)(3) requires state permit programs "[t]o insure that the 
public, and any other State the waters of which may be affected, receive notice of each application for a permit and 
to provide an opportunity for public hearing before a ruling on each such application."  Id. 
 
 
[FN28]. 33 U.S.C. §  1342(b)(5) (1994).  Section 1342(b)(5) requires state permit programs  
  [t]o insure that any State (other than the permitting State), whose waters may be affected by the issuance of a 
permit may submit written recommendations to the permitting State (and the Administrator) with respect to any 
permit application and, if any part of such written recommendations are not accepted by the permitting State, that 
the permitting State will notify such affected State (and the Administrator) in writing of its failure to so accept such 




[FN29]. 33 U.S.C. §  1342(d)(2) (1994).  Section 1342(d)(2) provides:  
  No permit shall issue (A) if the Administrator within ninety days of the date of his notification under subsection 
(b)(5) of this section objects in writing to the issuance of such permit, or (B) if the Administrator within ninety days 
of the date of transmittal of the proposed permit by the State objects in writing to the issuance of such permit as 
being outside the guidelines and requirements of this chapter.  Whenever the Administrator objects to the issuance 
of a permit under this paragraph such written objection shall contain a statement of the reasons for such objection 




[FN30]. 33 U.S.C. §  1342(a)(3) (1994). 
 
 
[FN31]. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 103 (1992). 
 
 




[FN33]. 33 U.S.C. §  1341(a) (1994).  Section 1341(a)(2) provides:  
  Whenever such a discharge may affect, as determined by the Administrator, the quality of the waters of any other 
State, the Administrator within thirty days of the date of notice of application for such Federal license or permit shall 
so notify such other State, the licensing or permitting agency, and the applicant.  If, within sixty days after receipt of 
such notification, such other State determines that such discharge will affect the quality of its waters so as to violate 
any water quality requirement in such State, and within such sixty-day period notifies the Administrator and the 
licensing or permitting agency in writing of its objection to the issuance of such license or permit and requests a 
public hearing on such objection, the licensing or permitting agency shall hold such a hearing.  The Administrator 
shall at such hearing submit his evaluation and recommendations with respect to any such objection to the licensing 
or permitting agency.  Such agency, based upon the recommendations of such State, the Administrator, and upon 
any additional evidence, if any, presented to the agency at the hearing, shall condition such license or permit in such 
manner as may be necessary to insure compliance with applicable water quality requirements.  If the imposition of 
conditions cannot insure such compliance such agency shall not issue such license or permit.  
33 U.S.C. §  1341(a)(2) (1994).  The CWA further provides that "[n]o license or permit shall be granted if 




[FN34]. At least one commentator has argued that whether a permit is state- or EPA-issued is a key issue with 
regard to tribal ability to enforce water quality standards against upstream polluters.  See Robin Kundis Craig, 
Borders and Discharges: Regulation of Tribal Activities under the Clean Water Act in States with NPDES Program 
Authority, 16 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 1, 13-16 (1997).  Craig attempts to distinguish existing case law governing 
the ability of downstream states and tribes to enforce their water quality standards against upstream polluters based 
on the fact that the NPDES permits were EPA- rather than state-issued.  Id.  Craig asserts that in the case of state 
permit program application, "the downstream... tribe's real influence on the permitting state or tribe depends largely 
on the EPA's willingness to object to the permit involved."  Id. at 15.  Craig fails to consider the impact of the EPA's 
trust obligation on the agency's decision-making process, discussed in detail in Part V. 
 
 
[FN35]. 33 U.S.C. §  1370 (1994).  Section 1370 provides:  
  Except as expressly provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall (1) preclude or deny the right of any State 
or political subdivision thereof or interstate agency to adopt or enforce (A) any standard or limitation respecting 
discharges of pollutants, or (B) any requirement respecting control or abatement of pollution; except that if an 
effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of 
performance is in effect under this chapter, such State or political subdivision or interstate agency may not adopt or 
enforce any effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard 
of performance which is less stringent than the effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, 
pretreatment standard, or standard of performance under this chapter; or (2) be construed as impairing or in any 
manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of 




[FN36]. James M. Grijalva, Tribal Governmental Regulation of Non-Indian Polluters of Reservation Waters, 71 
N.D. L. Rev. 433, 458 (1995). 
 
 
[FN37]. Mark A. Bilut, Note, Albuquerque v. Browner, Native American Tribal Authority Under the Clean Water 
Act: Raging Like a River Out of Control, 45 Syracuse L. Rev. 887, 917 (1994). 
 
 
[FN38]. Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 493-94 (1987). 
 
 




[FN40]. Because Arkansas did not have an EPA-approved state permitting program, the EPA was the appropriate 
permit issuing authority under §  1342(a)(1) of the CWA. 
 
 
[FN41]. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 104-05 (1992). 
 
 
[FN42]. Id. at 105 (quoting 40 C.F.R. §  122.4(d) (1991)).  The EPA's regulations further require that "[i]n 
designating uses of a water body and the appropriate criteria for those uses, the State shall take into consideration 
the water quality standards of downstream waters and shall ensure that its water quality standards provide for the 
attainment and maintenance of the water quality standards of downstream waters."  40 C.F.R. §  131.10(b) (2000). 
 
 
[FN43]. Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 105 n.10; 40 C.F.R. §  123.25 (2000). 
 
 
[FN44]. Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 105-06. 
 
 
[FN45]. Id. at 106. 
 
 
[FN46]. Id. at 110; see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) 
(establishing two-part test for evaluating statutory construction by administrative agencies and stating that 




[FN47]. See 33 U.S.C. §  1377 (1994). 
 
 
[FN48]. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation That Pertain to Standards on Indian Reservations, 
56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,879 (Dec. 12, 1991) [hereinafter EPA Final Rule] (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131 (2000)). 
 
 
[FN49]. 33 U.S.C. §  1377(e) (1994); see also 40 C.F.R. §  130.6(d) (2000); 40 C.F.R. §  131.8 (2000).  In the 
application for TAS status, tribes must  
  make a relatively simple showing of facts that there are waters within the reservation used by the Tribe or tribal 
members, (and thus that the Tribe or tribal members could be subject to exposure to pollutants present in, or 
introduced into, those waters) and that the waters and critical habitat are subject to protection under the Clean Water 
Act.  
EPA Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,879. 
 
 
[FN50]. 33 U.S.C. §  1377(h)(2) (1994). 
 
 
[FN51]. 33 U.S.C. §  1377(h)(1) (1994).  Indian land on reservations falls within four categories.  The vast majority 
of land is held by the federal government in trust for the tribes.  The government holds additional land in trust for 
individual Indians.  Non-Indians own some reservation land in fee simple.  Finally, Indians own a small fraction of 
reservation land in fee simple.  See infra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 
 
[FN52]. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 125-26  (1993); Narragansett Indian Tribe of 





[FN53]. EPA Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,881. 
 
 
[FN54]. Id. at 64,882. 
 
 
[FN55]. 33 U.S.C. §  1377(e) (1994).  Other enumerated sections are §  1254 (research, investigations, training and 
information), §  1256 (grants for pollution control programs), §  1315 (state reports on water quality), §  1318 
(reporting requirements), §  1319 (enforcement of standards), §  1324 (clean lake programs), §  1329 (non-point 
source management programs), and §  1344 (issuance of permits for dredged or fill material). See Jane Marx et al., 
Tribal Jurisdiction over Reservation Water Quality and Quantity, 43 S.D. L. Rev. 315, 329 (1998); William C. 
Galloway, Note & Comment, Tribal Water Quality Standards Under the Clean Water Act: Protecting Traditional 
Cultural Uses, 70 Wash. L. Rev. 177, 188 (1995).  Additionally, §  1377 provides tribes with TAS status with regard 
to allocation of water use rights within its jurisdiction, gives the EPA rather than states jurisdiction over sewage 
treatment works on reservations, provides for the reservation of funds for grants for waste treatment management 
plan development to serve Indian tribes, and allows tribes to enter into cooperative joint planning and administration 




[FN56]. Craig, supra note 34, at 10-12; 40 C.F.R. §  123.31 (2000). 
 
 
[FN57]. 40 C.F.R. §  131.8 (2000). 
 
 






[FN60]. 40 C.F.R. §  131.7 (2000). 
 
 
[FN61]. 40 C.F.R. §  131.7(b)(6) (2000). 
 
 
[FN62]. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
 
 
[FN63]. See David H. Getches et al., Federal Indian Law 63 (4th ed. 1998). 
 
 
[FN64]. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 588-89. 
 
 
[FN65]. Id. at 576. 
 
 




[FN67]. Id. at 584. 
 
 
[FN68]. Id. at 587. 
 
 
[FN69]. Id. at 593. 
 
 
[FN70]. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
 
 
[FN71]. See U.S. Const. art. III, §  2. 
 
 
[FN72]. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17. 
 
 
[FN73]. Id.  However, the Court referenced only extinguishing the Indian right of occupancy via voluntary cessation 
to the government.  Notably absent was the other means of extinguishing title mentioned in Johnson--conquest. 
 
 
[FN74]. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
 
 
[FN75]. Id. at 542. 
 
 
[FN76]. Id. at 561-63. 
 
 
[FN77]. Id. at 559.  Marshall noted that the only aspect of this inherent sovereignty the tribes had surrendered was 
the power to engage in "intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discoverer."  Id. 
 
 






[FN80]. One commentator has denominated this the "sovereign trusteeship" model.  Mary Christina Wood, Indian 
Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 Utah L. Rev. 1471, 1498-1505. 
Under this model, the federal government polices and protects the tribes' interest in native separatism, but does not 
possess unfettered federal dominion over the tribes.  This trust paradigm, though undermined by subsequent 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, represents the most promising approach to federal-Indian relations.  See id. 
 
 
[FN81]. 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
 
 










[FN85]. Id. at 384.  This reasoning seems a bit circular.  The Court could be heard to say that exercise of federal 
power over the tribes, whether or not previously judicially or constitutionally sanctioned, gave rise to a federal 
protective obligation to the tribes.  This obligation, in turn, gives rise to the very power which contributed to the 
tribes' dependent state and need for protection. 
 
 
[FN86]. See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913). 
 
 
[FN87]. See Wood, supra note 80, at 1504-05.  Professor Wood notes that the trust responsibility predates Kagama 
and its doctrine of "unfettered federal dominion."  Id.  Under the plenary power doctrine, however, tribal sovereignty 
may exist only so long as Congress allows it to exist, "for Congress can unilaterally and whimsically destroy the 
ability of tribes to exercise self-governing powers."  Robert A. Williams, Jr., Learning Not to Live with Eurocentric 
Myopia: A Reply to Professor Laurence's Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress Over the Indian 
Nations, 30 Ariz. L. Rev. 439, 449 (1988).  But see Robert Laurence, Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of 
Congress Over the Indian Nations: An Essay in Reaction to Professor Williams' Algebra, 30 Ariz. L. Rev. 413, 422-




[FN88]. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 381-82. 
 
 
[FN89]. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).  The Talton Court held that Fifth Amendment due process 
constraints do not apply to tribal powers of local self-government because of the inherent nature of Indian 




[FN90]. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); see also  Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 
1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1975) ("Indian tribes possess an inherent sovereignty except where it has been specifically 
taken away from them by treaty or act of Congress."). 
 
 
[FN91]. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326.  Those aspects of sovereignty that the tribes have lost include the ability to 
alienate land freely, the power to enter into direct commercial or governmental relations with foreign nations, and 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.  Id. 
 
 
[FN92]. Talton, 163 U.S. at 380 (1896); see also United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (noting that 
tribes are "unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory"). 
 
 
[FN93]. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326.  In Wheeler, the Supreme Court held that the Navajo Tribe was a sovereign 
separate from the federal government such that Fifth Amendment protections against double jeopardy were not 








[FN95]. Indeed, the "tribal land base is the sine qua non of sovereignty."  Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the 
Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A New Trust Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 
1995 Utah L. Rev. 109, 133.  Professor Wood identifies four aspects of tribal sovereignty: tribal land base; 
economic vitality; self-government; and cultural vitality.  Id. at 133-222. 
 
 
[FN96]. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381, 384. 
 
 
[FN97]. Id. at 381. 
 
 




[FN99]. Marx et al., supra note 55, at 319. 
 
 
[FN100]. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564  (1981) (noting tribes retain regulatory power over 
internal tribal relations and jurisdiction over tribal criminal offenders); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323-
24 (1978) (stating criminal jurisdiction remains vested in Navajo Tribe). 
 
 
[FN101]. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195  (1978). 
 
 
[FN102]. See generally Montana, 450 U.S. at 561-62 (discussing limitations on tribal regulatory jurisdiction to land 
owned by or held in trust for Indians or reserved for use by Indians). 
 
 
[FN103]. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).  Non-Indians came to own reservation land as a result of a congressional allotment 
policy.  In 1887, Congress passed the General Allotment Act, or Dawes Act, under which Indian families or 
individual Indians were allotted parcels of reservation land, eventually to be owned in fee simple.  Because the 
allotted land lacked the size and quality necessary to sustain its owners, most allotted land eventually fell into non-
Indian fee simple ownership as a result of sale or state tax lien foreclosure. Additionally, the government often sold 
to non-Indians "surplus" land not needed for allotment.  In the roughly fifty years the allotment policy was in effect, 




[FN104]. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564. 
 
 
[FN105]. Id. at 565. 
 
 
[FN106]. Id. at 565-66 (citations omitted). 
 
 
[FN107]. 492 U.S. 408 (1989). 
 
 
[FN108]. The "open" area of the reservation consisted of a hodgepodge of fee simple land and land held in trust for 
the tribe or tribe members by the federal government.  By contrast, the "closed" area was almost entirely trust land, 




[FN109]. Justices White, Scalia, and Kennedy, along with Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that the Yakima Tribe 
lacked zoning jurisdiction over the "open" area.  Id. at 432.  However, the White plurality felt further factfinding 
was necessary to determine whether the Tribe had jurisdiction over fee land in the "closed" area under one of the 
Montana exceptions.  Id. Justices Stevens and O'Connor concurred with the White plurality regarding zoning 
jurisdiction in the "open" area, id. at 447, but also issued the judgment of the Court that the Yakima Tribe possessed 
jurisdiction over the "closed" area, id. at 444.  Finally, Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall ruled that the 
Yakima Tribe had jurisdiction over both areas.  Id. at 465. 
 
 
[FN110]. The opinions of Justices White and Blackmun applied Montana, while Justice Stevens's opinion discussed 
Montana only tangentially. 
 
 
[FN111]. 520 U.S. 438 (1997). 
 
 
[FN112]. Id. at 445. 
 
 
[FN113]. Wood, supra note 80, at 1495 n.114. 
 
 
[FN114]. Id. at 1497; Wood, supra note 95, at 114. 
 
 
[FN115]. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974). 
 
 
[FN116]. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
 
 
[FN117]. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913). 
 
 
[FN118]. See, e.g., Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972). 
 
 
[FN119]. Getches et al., supra note 63, at 129-31 (quoting Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial 
Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long As Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"--How Long a 
Time is That?, 63 Cal. L. Rev. 601, 618-19 (1975) (footnotes omitted)). 
 
 
[FN120]. Other sources of law providing "broad foundational principles courts may draw upon in developing the 
Indian trust doctrine" include "statements of congressional policy," "other judicial doctrines now well- established in 
Indian law," and "broad, organic principles of private trust law."  Wood, supra note 95, at 123-25. 
 
 
[FN121]. See, e.g., Treaty of Hopewell, Nov. 28, 1785, art. 3, 7 Stat. 18, 19 (acknowledging the Cherokee Nation to 
be under the exclusive protection of the United States).  Analyzing this article of the Treaty of Hopewell and 
recognizing the retained sovereignty of the Cherokee Nation, Chief Justice Marshall noted that "[p]rotection does 
not imply the destruction of the protected."  Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 552 (1832). 
 
 
[FN122]. See, e.g., Treaty of Point no Point, Jan. 26, 1855, art. 2, 12 Stat. 933 (asserting that no "white man [shall] 
 
be permitted to reside upon the [reservation of several Northwest tribes] without permission of the said tribes"); 
Treaty of Hopewell, Nov. 28, 1785, art. 5, 7 Stat. 18, 19 (allowing the Cherokee Nation to punish non-Indians who 
settle or had settled on reservation land). 
 
 
[FN123]. Although this federal duty of protection was originally premised on concepts of native separatism and 
sovereignty, it has been "reconceptualized by some lawmakers into a guardian-ward relationship attributable to a 
situation of extreme dependency."  Wood, supra note 80, at 1503.  Under either formulation, however, the obligation 
remains the same. 
 
 
[FN124]. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). 
 
 
[FN125]. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942). 
 
 
[FN126]. See Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 379 (1st Cir. 1975) 
(recognizing a trust relationship arising from the Indian Nonintercourse Act, which regulated non-Indian trade with 
and conduct toward Indian tribes). 
 
 
[FN127]. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 256 (D.D.C. 1972). 
 
 
[FN128]. Id. at 256-57. 
 
 
[FN129]. Getches et al., supra note 63, at 344 (quoting Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal 
Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 1213, 1247-48 (1975)). 
 
 
[FN130]. Pyramid Lake, 354 F. Supp. at 257.  The trust obligation in the context of administrative action is 
enforceable under the Administrative Procedure Act, as well as via equitable, declaratory, or mandamus relief, and 
under the Indian Claims Commission Act.  Wood, supra note 80, at 1514-15. 
 
 









[FN134]. Id. at 133.  Other protected beneficiary interests include economic vitality, self-government, and cultural 
vitality.  See id. at 150- 223. 
 
 
[FN135]. The Dawes Act, discussed supra note 103, provided for the allotment of reservation land to individual 
Indians and families.  The federal government was to hold allotted land in trust for twenty-five years before passing 
fee simple title to the Indian allottee.  In some cases, this trust period was extended.  In 1934, Congress passed the 
Indian Reorganization Act, which ended allotment and provided that allotted land held in trust would remain so 




[FN136]. The United States Claims Court has recognized water rights as a trust property that the United States 
government, as trustee, has a duty to protect.  Fort Mojave Indian Tribe v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 417, 426 (1991), 
aff'd, 64 F.3d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 
 
[FN137]. See Wood, supra note 95, at 140-41. 
 
 
[FN138]. 506 F. Supp. 187, 203 (W.D. Wash. 1980), vacated in part by  759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985) (remanding 
to the district court for further factfinding).  Notably, the Washington case dealt with a specific treaty fishing clause. 
 
 
[FN139]. Termination refers to a federal policy in effect from 1945 to 1961 under which Congress terminated 
federal recognition of certain Indian tribes with the goal of complete Indian integration into mainstream society.  
With termination of federal recognition, federal support of the terminated tribe ceased.  See Getches et al., supra 
note 63, at 204-24. 
 
 
[FN140]. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 provided a mechanism through which tribes could among other 
things adopt, subject to Department of Interior approval, constitutions and establish tribal councils.  Invariably, these 
governments were modeled after the Federal Constitution, although tribal councils often lack separation of powers.  
Id. at 192-200. 
 
 
[FN141]. Galloway, supra note 55, at 179. 
 
 
[FN142]. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Policy for the Administration of Environmental Programs on Indian 
Reservations (Nov. 8, 1984) [hereinafter EPA Indian Policy], available at http:// 















[FN147]. 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 
 
[FN148]. 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 
 








[FN151]. The City of Albuquerque raised seven issues on appeal:  
  (1) whether the district court's opinion and order should be vacated because the case is mooted by an agreement 
negotiated by the parties; (2) whether the EPA reasonably interpreted §  1377 of the Clean Water Act as providing 
the Isleta Pueblo's authority to adopt water quality standards that are more stringent than required by the statute, and 
whether the Isleta Pueblo standards can be applied by the EPA to upstream permit users; (3) whether the EPA 
complied with the Administrative Procedure Act's notice and comment requirements in approving the Isleta Pueblo's 
standards under the Clean Water Act; (4) whether the EPA's approval of the Isleta Pueblo's standards was supported 
by a rational basis; (5) whether the EPA's adoption of regulations providing for mediation or arbitration to resolve 
disputes over unreasonable consequences of a tribe's water quality standards is a reasonable interpretation of §  
1377(e) of the Clean Water Act; (6) whether the EPA's approval of the Isleta Pueblo's ceremonial use designation 
offends the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment; and (7) whether the Isleta Pueblo's standards approved by 
the EPA are so vague as to deprive Albuquerque of due process.  






[FN153]. Id. at 422. 
 
 









[FN157]. Id. at 423-24. 
 
 
[FN158]. Id. at 424.  The court reasoned that §  1377 incorporates §  1342, which gives the EPA authority to require 
upstream NPDES permit holders to comply with downstream standards, and §  1342 incorporates §  1311, which 
provides the EPA authority to issue NPDES permits in compliance with downstream standards.  Id. at 424 n.13. 
 
 
[FN159]. 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 
 
[FN160]. Id. at 1139. 
 
 
[FN161]. Id. at 1140. 
 
 
[FN162]. The specific regulation at issue was 40 C.F.R. §  131.8(a)(3), which states that water quality standards 
must pertain to management and protection of water resources that are within the borders of a reservation. See id. 
 
 




[FN164]. EPA Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,878 (Dec. 12, 1991)  (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131 (2000)). 
 
 
[FN165]. Id. at 64,879.  The EPA also noted the difficulty of "separat[ing] out the effects of water quality 
impairment on non-Indian fee land within a reservation with those on tribal portions" as a practical matter 
supporting one jurisdictional authority.  Id. at 64,878. 
 
 
[FN166]. Id. at 64,879. 
 
 






[FN169]. Id. (quoting Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 52 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
 
 
[FN170]. "Our decision is also fully consistent with the only other circuit opinion that has yet considered the issue of 
tribal authority to set water quality standards."  Id. at 1141. 
 
 
[FN171]. EPA Indian Policy, supra note 142. 
 
 
[FN172]. See Wood, supra note 95, at 225-33. 
 
 
[FN173]. 33 U.S.C. §  1370 (1994). 
 
 
[FN174]. EPA Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,886 (Dec. 12, 1991)  (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131 (2000)).  
"[Section 1370] is... a savings provision that indicates that existing State authority to regulate effluent discharges 
and/or set water quality standards is not preempted by the CWA, as long as the State standards/regulations are at 
least as stringent as required by the CWA."  Id. 
 
 
[FN175]. The EPA cites a statement by Senator Burdick, a member of the conference committee on the Water 
Quality Act of 1987, which indicates that the committee's intent was to grant Indian tribes "the same regulatory 
jurisdiction over water quality matters with regard to waters within Indian jurisdiction that States have been 
exercising over their water."  Id.  The agency further noted that if tribes could set water quality standards equivalent 
only to the federal minimum standards, the dispute resolution provision would be superfluous.  Id. 
 
 
[FN176]. City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 423 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 
 
[FN177]. Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 1998) (asserting that "the scope of inherent tribal authority 
is a question of law for which EPA is entitled to no deference"). 
 
 
[FN178]. See, e.g., Albuquerque, 97 F.3d at 426 (stating that "[w]hether the more stringent standard is attainable is a 
matter for the EPA to consider in its discretion"); Bilut, supra note 37, at 902 (noting that although states may set 




[FN179]. 5 U.S.C. §  706(2)(A) (1994). 
 
 
[FN180]. Bilut, supra note 37, at 902. 
 
 
[FN181]. Albuquerque, 137 F.3d at 426. 
 
 
[FN182]. Bilut, supra note 37, at 909. 
 
 
[FN183]. Id. at 912. 
 
 
[FN184]. 33 U.S.C. §  1377(e) (1994). 
 
 




[FN186]. 33 U.S.C. §  1341(a)(1) (1994). 
 
 






[FN189]. 33 U.S.C. §  1342(d)(2) (1994). 
 
 
[FN190]. Although tribes conceivably could set water quality standards that are absurdly stringent and unattainable 
even with improved technology, this possibility does not detract from the EPA's trust doctrine responsibility to 
enforce tribal standards.  Furthermore, a good faith standard could be imposed to constrain tribes from the unlikely 
imposition of unattainable standards. 
 
 
[FN191]. EPA Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,887-88 (Dec. 12, 1991)  (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131 (2000)). 
 
 
[FN192]. 40 C.F.R. §  131.7(f)(3) (2000). 
 
 
[FN193]. 33 U.S.C. §  1377(e) (1994). 
 
 
[FN194]. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulations that Pertain to Standards on Indian Reservations, 
54 Fed. Reg. 39,098, 39,104 (proposed Sept. 22, 1989) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131 (2000)); see also EPA Final 




[FN195]. EPA Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,891. 
 
 
[FN196]. Id.; see also 33 U.S.C. §  1313(c)(4) (1994). 
 
 






[FN199]. See EPA Indian Policy, supra note 142. 
 
 
[FN200]. 40 C.F.R. §  131.8 (a)(2) (2000). 
 
 
[FN201]. EPA Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,879. 
 
 
[FN202]. Principles of inherent Indian sovereignty also support tribal promulgation of water quality standards for 
reservations.  In light of extremely diminished off-reservation sovereign power, however, tribes can best rely on the 
trust doctrine to support upstream enforcement of those standards. 
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